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SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF 
GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The structure of natural languages as studied by linguists is connected 
in several ways with phenomena outside this domain. Problems of this kind 
are, to mention only three: 
(a)  the acoustical and physiological interpretation  of  the primitive ele- 
ments in which the sound structure is represented; 
(b) the conceptual or referential interpretation of  the primitive elements 
that build up the meanings of the utterances; 
(c)  the structural relationships that go beyond the single sentences, usually 
taken as the largest units to be analyzed linguistically, i.e.,  the question as 
to the conditions that two or more sentences must meet in order to form a 
connected text. (This problem is not to be confused with the conditions for 
actually using a sentence, i.e., speech performance.1) 
Only the first of  these topics has been  studied to a certain extent; very 
little is known about the last two. In the following we will be concerned with 
the second problem, viz.  the relationship between language structure and 
certain aspects of concept formation or structure of thought, as it were. This 
problem is in a certain sense parallel to the 6rst one: it demands an inter- 
pretation and motivation of the primitive terms that enter into the descrip- 
tion of given languages. 
1.2.  It is generally agreed among linguists that the meanings of  words or 
morphemes are not unanalyzable wholes, but are composed of smaller ele- 
ments, the minimal content units of  Hjelmslev or the semantic markers of 
Fodor and Katz. These elements are the primes to be  used in systematic 
descriptions of  the semantic structure  of  natural languages. Now  it has 
turned out in the study of  sound structure that there are good reasons to 
assume a universal stock of primitive elements, called phonetic features, from 
which the particular inventories used in the description of  particular lan- 
guages are drawn.2 It seems, therefore, reasonable to ask whether the in- 
For a somewhat more detailed discussion of  these problems see Bierwisch, 'Aufgaben 
und  Form  der  Grammatik'.  to amear in  II.  Internationales Svm~osium  'Zeichen und  .-  . . 
System der Sprache', Berlin 1966. 
a  For details see Jakobson, Fant, Halle, Preliminaries to Speech Analysis,  MIT-Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1951. 
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ventories of  primitive semantic elements of  different languages are to be 
selected in a similar fashion from a universal set of semantic primes. This is 
what is presupposed by Fodor and Katz; they assume that it is possible to 
"construct  a metatheory which contains an enumeration of  the semantic 
markers from which the theoretical vocabulary of each particalar semantic 
theory is drawn".3 This does not mean, of course, that the dicti&nary  of each 
given language must show exactly the same distinctions as that of any other 
language. It implies only that, if a distinction is made, this property can he 
characterized in a nontrivial way in terms of the universal set of semantic 
markers.  If we  accept this view, then two different questions immediately 
arise: 
(1)  What is the theoretical  status of the universal semantic markers; how 
must they be interpreted? 
(2) What are the elements of the universal set and how can they be estab- 
lished? 
It is obvious that the answer to (2)  depends in part on the answer to (1). 
Note that (1) does not concern the state of the elements within the semantic 
theory of a particulax language or even within the general scheme of snch 
a theory. In both they are simply primitive formal elements. The question 
here is: in what way, by what type of phenomena, are they motivated outside 
the structure of language in the narrower sense? In other words: what is the 
interpretation of the semantic markers, how are they connected with thought? 
1.3.  A widespread view on this problem is that semantic properties are to 
be  stated in terms of  classes of  objects or conditions of  the surrounding 
universe, including abstract relations,  general structures of the world, and 
so on. These properties are to a large extent the subject matter of different 
sciences, snch as physics, biology, social sciences. With this in mind Bloom- 
field writes: "In  practice, we  define the meaning of a linguistic form, where- 
ever we can, in terms of some other science."4 Bloomfield's conclusion that 
we can give a full account of the meaning of natural languages only if  we 
have a total knowledge of the universe represents a very extreme position in 
this matter. But it shares with less extreme views the assumption that each 
distinction made in the meanings of  a given language, i.e.,  each semantic 
marker, is connected with certain classes of  objects, types of  relations,  or 
properties of the universe which the speakers of that language inhabit. What 
one has to learn in the course of language acquisition are just these distin- 
guished classes and relations,  and the forms by means of  which they are 
Fodor and Katz, 'The Structure of a Semantic Theory', Languoge 39 (1963) 208 
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referred to. It is obvious that within this conception the semantic markers 
happen to be universal only because different speech communities live in the 
same universe,  and  only  to the extent that their  cultural  environment is 
alike. To learn a new language then forces one to learn not only new lexical 
items, new syntactic and phonological rules, but also new semantic mark- 
ers. 5 
It is very well known that the identification  of semantic features of lan- 
guage with classes of objects and properties of the world, more or less ex- 
plicitly stated in the conception just sketched, leads to many complications. 
Not only is there no reasonable explication of how the semantic markers are 
learned. It is also very difficult to explain in a natural way such well known 
facts as displaced speech, fictitious  objects and in general all gaps between 
meaning and reality. 
All these difficulties can be avoided, much more insight in the structure of 
language can be achieved, if we give up this misleading view and take a quite 
different position. 
There are good reasons to believe that the semantic markers in an ade- 
quate description of a natural language do not represent properties of the 
surrounding world  in the broadest  sense, but rather certain deep seated, 
innate properties  of  the human organism and the perceptual  apparatus, 
properties  which  determine the way  in which  the universe  is  conceived, 
adapted, and worked on. Or as Postal puts it: "Each  of these primitives [of 
the semantic theory -  M.B.] bears a fixed relation to the universe which is 
determined by the biological  structure of the organism. Thus the relation 
between the semantic primitives and their combinations which are part of 
the combinatorial structure of language and the world is not learned but 
innate.  what must be learned is only the relations between fixed sets of 
semantic primitives and sets of phonological and syntactic properties. Learn- 
ing the meanings of forms (by child or foreigner) is thus a process of using 
contextual information  and  perhaps  other  knowledge  and  experience to 
determine which of the priorly known semantic primitives are associated with 
the dictionary entries of the forms in question. Naturally  under this con- 
ception one would expect to find just exactly the lack of direct relation be- 
tween the meanings of forms and the observable contexts of their utterance 
or perception  or between meanings  and the accompanying observable be- 
5  In this respect there is no real difference between the views just discussed and those of 
Whorf. Weisnerber and others who believe that the aooercention  of the world deoends  -  -.  . 
on the internalized language. Here too learning a new language involves learning new 
basic components of meaning, and these components are also interpreted in terms of the 
surroundinn universe.  The universalitv of these nrimitive elements aooears to he much 
more unlikely than that of the semanic primitives in the theories discussed above. 
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havior  of  speakers or listeners which obtains in every known language."e 
Notice that the idea of innate basic elements of the semantic structure does 
not entail a biological determination  of  concepts or meanings in a given 
language, but only of their ultimate components. These components can be 
combined rather freely and differently in different languages. It is always 
possible to grasp new concepts while learning a new language and even within 
one language. But to learn a new concept means then to learn a new con- 
figuration of potentially known primitive elements. Furthermore, the uni- 
versality of semantic markers does not mean that all markers are part of the 
structure of every language but only that it has a general interpretation if it 
should appear in a certain language. 
If this view is acceptable, and it seems to me that it is, then the universality 
of semantic markers is not a theoretical accident but rather a constitutive 
fact of human speech, of the capacity that de Saussure called langage. And 
on the basis of this view a very revealing answer to our question (1) can be 
developed. Of  course, almost nothlng is known at the moment about the 
structure of this apparatus of primitive conceptual elements and its relation 
to the real world. But it seems possible to make the first steps towards in- 
vestigating these postulated  elements.7 In this  sense I will  analyze some 
features pertinent to a group of German adjectives. This will lead us to some 
preliminary conclusions and we will then come hack to the second question 
raised above. 
2. POLARITY OF GERMAN ADJECTIVES 
2.1.  The presupposed syntactic framework of the following considerations 
is a generative grammar of German. But we can restrict our attention to some 
very simple sentence types and we  will be concerned only with abstract deep 
structures.8 Furthermore it is necessary to keep in mind that a semantic de- 
scription of  some natural language must contain not only the characteri- 
zation  of the lexical entries, i.e., the combination of the semantic markers 
within the words or morphemes, but also the rules that determine how the 
meanings of larger constituents and whole sentences are constructed out of 
"ostal,  Review Article of AndrC Martinet, Elements of GeneralLinguistics, in Foundations 
of Language 2 (1966) 179, 
" Actually the first steps have already been taken. We may cite here many of Jakobson's 
morphological investigations, Bech's  Grundziige der semantischen Entwicklttngsgesehiehfe 
der hochdeutrchen Modalverba, Kapenhagen 1951, Leisi's very insightful Der  Wortinhalt, 
seine Struktur  im Deutschen  und Englischen, Heidelberg 1953, from which many of the 
following observations are drawn. This list could easily be extended. What remains to be 
done is to incorporate all these and many other observations in a general theory. 
For  the notions of deep structure  and  surface structure see for  instance Chomsky, 
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the word meanings on the basis of the syntactic structure of these constitu- 
ents. We will be concerned primarily with the meanings of  words. But even 
these can be stated adequately only if they are seen as entities which enter 
by means of certain rules into the complex meaning of any possible syntactic 
configuration.% 
The sentence types considered in the following are essentially copula sen- 
tences with Adj(ectiva1) as predicate and in some cases intransitive sentences 
with an Adv(erbia1) manifested by an Adj. These sentences have deep phrase 
markers as in (3) and (4) respectively: 
(3) c  x 
Verb  Phrase  ~Ziliary 
-pula  Determiner  Noun  A. 
Degree  Adjective 
I 
DAS  BUCH  SEHR  SCHLECHT  SEl  PRESENT 
These structures are oversimplified in several respects which do not concern 
us here. They are ultimately mapped by transformational and morphological 
rules on the actual sentences (5) and (6): 
(5)  Das Buch ist sehr schlecht. 
(6)  Das Flugzeug fiegt 2000 Meter hoch. 
* This has been stated most clearly by  Fodor and Katz in  'The Structure of a Semantic 
Theory'.  Although we  will follow the principles developed there, certain modifications 
will be necessary. For technical details see section 4 below. Cf. also fn. 21  below. MANFRED BIERWISCH 
The constituent Deg(ree) may contain several structures, including the com- 
parative morpheme ER plus a suitable sentence as in Ein  Auto fahrt  lang- 
samer  als ein Flugzeugpiegt, elements like zu and genug  as in Der Tisch ist 
zu klein fur  diesen Zweck, etc.10 Certain context restrictions on the appear- 
ance of Deg are necessary. Some aspects of these restrictions we will touch 
on later.  Roughly then an A4  in German is a constituent containing an 
adjective possibly modified by certain types of Deg and modifying in turn 
either the subject of a copula type sentence (the head of a NP in appropriate 
derived structures) or the main verb. This is a simplification, useful only for 
the present purpose. 
2.2.  Consider now the following list of German adjectives: 
(7)  A: lang weit weit breit  hoch  tief  dick  dick  gross 
B:  kurz nah eng  schmal niedrig flach dunn schlank klein 
A:  alt  alt  schnell  lang fruh 
B:  neu jung langsam kurz spat 
A: gut  gut  schon  groB schwer schwierig stark 
B:  bose schlecht haBlich klein leicht  leicht  schwach 
A: laut hoch hell 
B:  leise tief  dunkel 
In this list the items are arranged in pairs due to the already known fact that 
"polarity"  plays an important role in the structure of adjectives.'l  The set 
of pairs can easily he extended, and a lot of "derived"  adjectives receive their 
counterpart by the prefix un as in koniglich -  unkoniglich, amerikanisch -  un- 
amerikanisch, etc. Some adjectives have more than one counterpart, corre- 
sponding to different meanings.12 Of course, not all adjectives are structured 
in this way,  the most important exception being the color words.13 In a 
lo Adetailed discussion of different  expansions of Deg(=  Grad) is to be found in Motsch, 
Syntax des deutschen Adjektivs (Studia Grammatica, Ill),  Berlin 1963. An analysis of the 
Measure Phrase in English which applies almost without modification also to German is 
to be found in a mimeographed paper by 1. R. Ross. 
l1 Cf. for instance Leisi. OD. eit.. and Brinkmann. Die Deuische Sorache. Diisseldorf 1962.  ..  . 
p. 123-30. 
l2 Actually the situation is somewhat more complicated. In some cases different caunter- 
Darts mav corres~ond  to d~fferent  meanines. as in hoch vs.  niedri~  and hoch vs.  tief (of  -.  .  ~ 
pitch). In other cases an adjective may be simply indifferent as to the different features of 
its counterparts. Possibly ah has not two different meanings which correspond to neu and 
jung.  Cf. section 5.2 below. 
l3 The lack of polarity is by  no means a superficial fact. It is very well known that color 
words are learned by the child far later than pairs as groJ  and klein, etc. This may be the 
case also for other nonpolar words such as nackt, taub, etc. Polarity then is basic in more 
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semantic theory of German this polarity has to be described in such a way 
that the following paraphrases follow automatically: 
(8)  (a)  Die Mauer ist zu hoch, -  Die Mauer ist nicht niedrig genug. 
(b) Die Mauer ist nicht zu hoch. -  Die Mauer ist niedrig genug. 
We can generalize this observation easily in the following manner, using A 
and B as variables over all corresponding entities headed by these letters in 
the list (7): 
(9)  Sentences of the following form are pairwise paraphrases: 
(a) x [..  ]  A fir  Y-x nicht [::I  fiir Y 
snug 
genug 
(b)Xnicht[..  ]AfiirY-X[zu  ]Bf"rY 
snug 
This statement applies to copula sentences as well as others. X and Y are 
variables over arbitrary strings. The element genug will be shifted ultimately 
behind the adjective. A formal explanation of (9) demands a general account 
of negation, for example, in the manner of Katz14,  a characterization of the 
antonyms zu and genug, and a suitable analysis of the sets A and B of adjec- 
tives. As to zu and genug we would say informally that they have to contain 
two antonymous markers which can be paraphrased roughly as "exceeding 
a certain norm"  and "meeting a certain norm"  respectively. What this norm 
actually is, is not shown by the isolated items, but is specified by the following 
adjective. So zu and genug  are instances of so called syncategorematic ele- 
ments, i.e., they have no autonomous meaning when isolated. Turning now 
to the adjectives involved, we  analyze each entry of (7) into a marker ex- 
pressing the polarization,  which we  will represent  as (+Pol)  and (-Pol), 
and a remainder R which in turn consists of a set of markers that will be left 
unspecified for the moment. We just  note that in general R is identical for 
each two  adjectives that are  paired  in (7).  So we  have  this  preliminary 
analysis: 
(10)  lang (f  Pol) R1, weit (+Pol) R2, weit (f Pol) R3 
kurz (-Pol)  R1, nah (-Pol)  R2, eng (-Pol)  R3, etc. 
l4 See for instance Katz. The Pkilosookv ofLan~uaze.  New York 1966. D. 201. It must be  -  -.  . . 
noted, that this account of negation muit  bemodified, since it is based on the assumption 
that the meaning of words and larger expressions consists of unstructured sets of markers. 
which is clearly inadequate. But we cannot go into details here. MANFRED BlERWISCH 
The (+Pol) and (-Pol)  markers then are the defining properties of the sets 
A and B respectively.15 
2.3.  Up to this point it is immaterial which one of two polar adjectives is 
assigned to the set A and which one to B: If our assumed rules yield the 
desired paraphrase-relation  (9) for lung and kurz by means of the analysis 
given in (lo), then they will yield the same result if we had (-Pol)  R1 for 
lung and (+Pol) R1 for kurz. The only necessary condition is that lang and 
kurz as well as the elements of other pairs have antonymous (Pol)-markers. 
Further observations show, however, that this condition is insufficient, i.e., 
that (+  Pol)-assignment is not arbitrary. Consider the following normal and 
odd sentences: 
(11)  (a) Der Tisch ist doppelt so lang wie die Bank. 
(b) Das Auto fahrt halb so schnell wie die Eisenbahn. 
(c)  Sein Bruder ist halb so alt wie er. 
(12)  (a)  *Der Tisch ist halb so kurz wie die Bank. 
(b)  *Das Auto fahrt doppelt so langsam wie die Eisenbahn. 
(c)  *Sein Bruder ist doppelt so jung wie er. 
The sentences in (12) are at least much more difficult to grasp than those in 
(ll), and there is good reason to mark them as deviant. This assumption 
requires some comment. Although (13) is odd in the same sense as (12), it 
sounds quite acceptable if for instance we  presuppose a request for thread 
as fme as possible: 
(13)  Der Faden ist doppelt so diinn wie ein Haar. 
Without some such condition we would have to mark (13) as deviant. We 
can generalize this statement for further purposes to the following principle: 
(14)  A sentence is the less normal the more conditions outside of it have 
to be met for it to be acceptable. 
This principle applies to a wide range of facts, and will be especially useful 
for estimating many  of the problematic  semantic data. It is,  of course,  a 
heuristic principle only, which does not belong to the theory proper, but I 
would assume that some version of this principle will find a strict and formal 
reconstruction even within general linguistic theory. 
If we then take the deviancy of (12) for granted, it follows that both direc- 
tions of polarity are not equivalent in each respect. We will analyze those 
adjectives for which the Deg may be expanded into doppelt so, halb so, zehn- 
ma1 so, etc., into (-6Pol)R. In this way we come to something like an "orien- 
'5 (+  Pol) and (-  Pol) turn out to be a generalization of the markers (+)and (-),  that 
Katz postulates for the analysis of good. See his The Philosophy of  Language, pp. 289-317. 
Cf. also fn. 28 below.  For a certain reservation see section 2.5 below. 
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tation" of the polarity. But notice that this orientation does not hold for all 
pairs of adjectives, i.e., not for all the remainders R. The following pairs of 
sentences are equally acceptable to me: 
(15)  (a)  Peter spielt doppelt so gut wie  Klaus. 
(b) Peter spielt halb so rchlecht wie Klaus. 
(16)  (a) Im Zimmer ist es halb so dunkel wie im Korridor. 
(b)  Im Zimmer ist es doppelt so hell wie im Korridor. 
So we are led to two subsets of pairs of adjectives: Those for which (t  Pol) 
marks an orientation and those for which it does not. Within the oriented 
setthereis afurthersubset that can be modified by M(easure) P(hrase). Here the 
orientation is much more clearly distinguished. We have only the sentences: 
(17)  (a)  Der Zug ist 10 Wagen lang. 
(b) Der FluB ist 250 Meter breit. 
(c)  Die Maschine fliegt 2000 Meter hoch. 
(d) Achim ist 35 Jahre alt. 
The foUowing sentences are indisputably odd: 
(18)  (a)  *Der Zug ist zwei Wagen kurz. 
(b) *Der Bach ist einen Meter schmal. 
(c)  *Die Maschine fliegt 100 Meter niedrig. 
(d)  *Katharina ist zwei Jahre jung. 
Only the (f Pol) marked elements of  an antonymous pair of  adjectives can 
take an MP, and in this case the whole Adjectival does not indicate one of 
the poles involved, but only the scale which is established by the pair and a 
certain point within this scale. The orientation can be taken as "neutralized". 
We can account for this semantic fact, if we formulate the rules for amalga- 
mating MP with the adjective so that the semantic characterization of  MP 
replaces the (+  Pol)-marker in A.16 
Fillmore in an article 'Entailment  Rules in a Semantic Theory', POLA Reporfs 10, 
Ohio State Universitv 1965. has nrooosed an analysis of such adiectives as tall. old. etc..  .  ..  ... 
which rsknthr.c.,mp~ratt\,cuonsrructi,,n  n  h,i<~nJ  intcrprui<  the~tljccri\esd~  relation.11 
elcment~.  Ftllniorc writer: "The theory will  initixlly Jsslsn ;I  rel:lti,,~lal  melning td norJs 
like 'tall'. Notice. however. that a sense relatine ohv  to the dimension ''height"  will also  -.  - 
he needcd for 'tall'- hut nor lor 'short'  a* is ,ten in thc\\,1).nc  ~nJerrt;tnJ  sucll cxpresstms 
;is 'six  inches tall' or 'this tall'.) ... In those ;a$.-,  \\here rlic sentence dvcr not c,,ntaln a 
second term for therelation, thisemantic theory will provide one, say the word 'average'." 
Certainly Fillmore is right with respect to the relational character of such items as tall, 
gro.8,  lang etc.,  if (+  Pol) is not substituted  by the content of an MP.  But an explicit 
reoresentation of this fact reauires at least the introduction of relational markers in the 
s.-rn:tntic theory. Although this is ne:~\xy fa  se$er:rl indepen~lent  reasmt, thc~r  fornul 
specific~t~on  \\'auld go far beyond thc lin>it2ti<,ns  oirhc  prcient article. Therefore ue  led\,e 
tie  relational character of the adjectives formally unexpressed, accounting for their re- 
lation to a given norm or presupposed average only by the interpretation of the (Pol)- 
markers in section 2.4 below. 
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2.4.  We have discussed only the formal aspects of certain meaning properties 
of adjectives, our motivation for establishing (+  Pol) and (-Pol)  was purely 
linguistic. We  can now look for the interpretative aspect. What facts are 
represented by our formal markers? If we hear the sentence Der Raum ist 
hoch, then we know that something about a certain dimension of a room is 
said, but we  do not know how large is that dimension, not even roughly. 
But if we hear Das Zimmer ist hoch, then we know that the vertical dimension 
of the room is at least about three meters. It may be larger by an uncertain 
but limited amount, if we  hear Das Zimmer ist sehr hoch. Similar consider- 
ations hold for Der Raum ist niedrig and Das Zimmer ist sehr niedrig. This 
last sentence may refer to the same situation as the sentence Das Zimmer ist 
nur 1,85  Meter hoch. The conclusion is obvious. The remainder R establishes 
a certain scale, and (+Pol) and (-Pol)  may fix a certain point within this 
scale only with respect to a certain norm. No such norm is contained in the 
sentences with Raum, but it is given with Zimmer.17 The norm is irrelevant, 
if an MP appears, and here the (Pol)-marker is erased from the semantic 
representation. This solves the often raised problem, whether jung  and alt 
and many other pairs have "discrete"  meanings. The question "up to which 
time is a man young, from what age on is he said to be old" is simply a 
pseudoquestion.  If one does not know the normal life span of  a Saurian, 
then one does not know how many years are implied by the sentence Der 
Saurier war alt, but one can very well understand the full meaning of the 
sentence, namely that the Saurian referred to has lived nearly all of his nor- 
mal life. And for the meaning of alt it is quite immaterial whether the num- 
ber of years implied in Der Elephant war sehr alt is smaller than in  the previ- 
ous example or not. 
From  these  considerations  we  may  draw  two  important  conclusions. 
Firstly the norm to which the poles of a scale are related may be represented 
in the semantic structure -  as in Zimmer, or may not he so represented -  as 
in Raum. In many cases the "objective correlate" of the norm does not belong 
to the language structure at all, and it may very well be the case that in all 
instances where the norm does become a feature of the linguistic structure, 
this norm may be directly or indirectly derived from the human organism. 
Secondly it is clear that the norm itself does not belong to the meaning of 
the adjectives discussed so far, even if the norm is represented by semantic 
markers. The adjectives are, therefore, syncategorematic in their meanings. 
What the adjectives express themselves is only the fact that a certain norm 
'7  Since the semantic theory has to characterize Zimmer as a room for human beings to 
live in, its size depends on the human body. So the (-  Pol) may refer to about 1,80 m. 
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is implied. The as yet unanalyzed remainder R establishes the scale to which 
the norm is related, and the (Pol)-markers give the type of relation to the 
norm. Thus we  may say that adjectives do not express norms, but norma- 
tivity. Now this normativity is likely to be a general feature of the appercep- 
tive structure of organisms. In many cases we may be completely unable to 
find any objective measure for a certain norm, as long as we do not take into 
account the structure of the organism interacting with the objective world. 
This normativity of the human organism we have found already in connec- 
tion with zu and genug, and we  will find it below in several other respects. 
2.5.  There are two further problems to be discussed. We have specified so 
far two subsets of pairs within the whole set of polarized adjectives: those 
for which the distribution of (+Pol) in the correlated pairs has linguistic 
effects, as in langlkurz vs. hell/dunkel, and then within this subset those pairs 
for which the (+Pol)-carrier  may be modified by  MP. Now the question 
arises  whether  these  subsets  may  be  characterized  by  further semantic 
markers, say (Orientation) for the first set, and (Orientation) (Measurable) 
for the second subset. In this case the features (+Pol) (Measurable) will 
qualify as context restriction for the appearence of MP. An interpretation 
of such markers seems to be reasonable within our presupposed framework. 
But another treatment may  be  more revealing. Notice,  first, that for all 
measurable  adjectives the orientation is an automatic consequence of  the 
rule for substituting the reading  of  MP  for (+Pol).  More generally: for 
measurable adjectives the (+Pol) is that of the increasing number of units. 
We have, e.g., schneN and aN  both marked (+Pol), though the first indicates 
short time, the second long time, roughly speaking. If we now assume that 
certain markers in R are the condition for an MP to modify an adjective, 
then  the properties  represented by  (Orientation)  and (Measurable)  are a 
direct effect of the structure of R, namely of the markers presupposed by MP. 
Similar considerations may hold for the orientation in nonmeasurable ad- 
jectives.  A decision in this respect requires further investigation not only of 
German adjectives, but also of related facts in other languages. 
Note by the way that measurability does not depend on any scientific sys- 
tem of measure or on our scientific knowledge of the world. On the one hand 
we have unscientific measurements such as Das Haus ist zehn Fenster breit, 
Die Grube ist drei Klafter tie-  On the other hand there are well defined units 
in physics for certain scales, but the corresponding adjectives remain un- 
measurable, such as hell or hoch with respect to sound.18 
A more complete treatment would distinguish between relative and absolute measure- 
ment,  because we have such sentences as Peter  singt drei Tdne hoh'her  01s  Klaus, but not 
Peter singf drei Tone hoch. Our discussion pertains only to absolute measurement. MANFRED BIERWISCH 
The second problem concerns the type of relation with respect to the given 
norm that (+  Pol) and (-Pol)  are meant to represent. There are two rather 
different placements of the norm with respect to the scale indicated by  R, 
for which langlkurz and gutlschlecht may serve as examples. Die Zigarette 
ist  lung  means that the cigarette is longer than the presupposed average, 
Die  Zigarette ist  kurz means it is shorter than the expected average.  lung 
and kurz are connected with the same scale, the extension of which may be 
established by the modiied noun, in our examples by the possible length of 
different cigarettes. Within that normalized scale there is a point indicating 
the expected average. Now (+ Pol) and (- Pol) indicate that the modified 
objects are placed at the one or the other half (or end) of the scale relative 
to the average point. That means they are in a certain sense inverse relations 
with the average as one of  its terms, the extension of the object in question 
as the other. The situation is quite different for gut/schlecht, as Mrs. Anna 
Wirzbicka has brought to my attention. Die Zigarefte isf  gut does not mean 
that the cigarette is better  than the average, but that it fits the expected 
standard, just  as Dze  Zigarette  ist schlecht  does not mean it is less  good 
than the average, but that it does not fit the standard. What is going on 
here may be paraphrased as foUows: The scale established by such pairs as 
gut/schlecht, schon/ha~lich,  gesundlkrank is not divided into two parts by 
the average point, but the norm is one of its end points. (+ Pol) here means: 
meeting this norm (or near to it), (- Pol) means: missing the norm (or far 
from it). Here too a relation between the norm and the object in question 
is represented by (+ Pol) and (- Pol), but they are not inverse in the same 
sense as they are for langlkurz. 
So we  have two classes of  adjectives: one for which the  normalization 
point around which the scale is arranged lies within the scale, and one for 
which  it is  one  of  its ends. These classes  are not coextensive with  that 
established by  the possibility of  absolute measurement. hell for instance 
cannot take an MP, but it belongs to the lang/kurz-class. But it seems to be 
that only for adjectives with the average within the scale relative measure- 
ment in the sense of  fn. 18 is possible. 
One may  ask now  whether  a precise, formal representation of  the re- 
lational character of  the (Pol-)markers would  split up these markers into 
two different pairs representing different  relations with respect to the normal- 
ization. Here  again  it seems possible  that  the  type  of  norm-relation is 
predictable  from the formal structure of  R, so that  one  general  pair  of 
(Pol)-markers is sufficient. But we need not decide that, because our further 
discussion pertains only to the langlkurz-type of  norm-relation. SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
3.  SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF GERMAN ADJECTIVES 
3.1.  We will turn now to the analysis of R. We already noted that R marks 
the scale for which (Pol) fixes a certain value or which is specified by the 
substituted markers of MP. In the latter case a specific unit of the measure 
appears in the Adjectival. For a certain subset of adjectives this unit charac- 
terizes length and may (but need not) be identical. These are lang, weit, hoch, 
breit, tief, dick, and groJ. To this group, together with their corresponding 
(-Pol)-elements,  we will now restrict our attention. 
All these adjectives are related somehow to the dimensions of space, at 
least as long as the modified nouns are physical objects. And the following 
discussion will be restricted to this class of cases. Since all physical objects 
have three dimensions orthogonal to each other -  which is, of course, a con- 
sequence of the human perceptual apparatus, not a property of the universe 
as such -  one could think of three markers (1 Dim), (2 Dim), and (3 Dim), 
characterizing lang, breit, and hoch as follows: 
(19)  lang  (+Pol) (1 Dim) 
breit  (+Pol) (2 Dim) 
hoch (+Pol) (3 Dim) 
Different combinations and further qualifications would be needed, of course, 
for the other spatial adjectives. Some reflection will show, however, that this 
abstract geometrical analysis is insufficient as a basis for the semantic struc- 
ture of natural languages. Although the three orthogonal dimensions organ- 
ize spatial experience of human beings, they are not symmetrical, or  regarded 
as  equivalent,  as in geometry.  Most importantly,  there  is  a  deep-seated 
difference between  the vertical  dimension  and the horizontal ones. This 
difference is psychologically well  attested  and concerns both practice and 
perception. As we will see later, it must be represented in the semantic struc- 
ture on purely linguistic grounds. We could do that by postulating a marker 
for verticality, which is (+Vert) for the vertical dimension and (-Vert)  for 
the others. These in turn may he differentiated by a marker, that specifies 
the secondary dimension as opposed to the primary one. So we arrive at the 
tentative analysis (20), which replaces (19). 
(20)  lang  (+Pol) (-Vert)  (-Second) 
breit  (+Pol) (-Vert)  (+Second) 
hoch (+Pol) (+Vert) 
These markers are not postulated  ad hoc, they  are needed elsewhere. (+ 
Second), for instance, must enter the semantic description of quer, Seite in MANFRED BlERWISCH 
one of its meanings, perhaps rechts and links, etc. (-Second),  is needed, La., 
for the preposition lings. (fVert) of course characterizes elements such as 
oben, unten, iiber, unfer,  but also the verbs steigen, fallen, heben, senken, and 
others. Most interesting in this connection are the verbs stellen and legen, 
both meaning "to  put".  stellen indicates  a placement with respect to the 
(+Vert)-axis  of an object, legen with respect to a (-Vert)-axis,  marked in 
the object. Thus we have: 
(21)  (a)  Er legte das Tuch auf den Tisch. 
(b)  *Er stellte das Tuch auf den Tisch. 
(c)  *Er legte den Topf auf den Tisch. 
(d)  Er stellte den Topf auf den Tisch. 
(e)  Er legte das Buch ins Regal. 
(f)  Er stellte das Buch ins Regal. 
Because a book can be placed both according to its (-Vert)  and (+Vert)- 
axis, (21)(e) and (f) are equally normal. And since a cloth normally can be 
put only according to (-Vert)-axis  and a pot only in its (+Vert)-axis, (21)(b) 
and (c) are deviant. 
Nevertheless, the semantic structure even of lang, breif, and hoch is much 
more complicated than the analysis (20) suggests. Some further observations 
will  make  that  clear.  Consider  the  following  normal  and  deviant  sen- 
tences: 
(22)  (a)  Der Wagen ist lang.  Der Wagen ist hoch. 
(b)  Die Stange ist lang.  Die Stange ist hoch. 
(c)  Die Zigarette ist lang.  *Die Zigarette ist hoch 
(d) *Der Turm ist lang.  Der Turm ist hoch. 
Wagen and Stange can he modified both by lung  and hoch, but in the case 
of  Wagen the two adjectives refer to different dimensions, whereas in the 
case of Stange the same dimension of the object is marked as (+Pol), the 
difference being only, that the pole modified by hoch is conceived as vertical, 
while nothing is said about verticality by the use of lang. This difference then 
is not inherent in the noun, but must be induced by the adjective. For Zina- 
rette and Turm, on the other hand, only one of the two adjectives can nor- 
mally be used, depending on their verticality or non-verticality. It follows 
from these facts, that the semantic structure of the adjectives in question is 
tied up in a rather complicated way with the structure of the modified nouns. 
The following scheme, where the (f Pol)-names for different dimensions of 
certain objects are listed, will clarify this further: SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
(23)  Noun  (1 Dim)  (2 Dim)  (3 Dim) 
Wagen  lang  breit  hoch 
Schrank  hoch  breit  tief 
Tiir  hoch  breit  dick 
Brett  lang  breit  dick 
L 
Zigarette  lang  dick 
Turm  hoch  dick 
Stange  1  E:h  1  dick 
Fenster  hoch  breit  - 
StraRe  lang  breit  - 
The  matter  becomes  yet  more  complicated,  if  groJ3  is  taken  into  ac- 
count: 
(24)  Noun  (1 Dim)  (2 Dim)  (3 Dim) 
Wagen  groB 
Tiir  groB  dick 
Brett  groR  '  dick 
Fenster  groR  - 
Stange  groB  dick 
Mensch  groD  dick 
For Stange I am not sure, that groj3 is normally used to indicate (+Pol) for 
length. In other cases, the domain of groj3 1s not clear without further quali- 
ficat~on:  Der  Schrank  ist  groj3  may concern  all three dimensions  or only 
(1 Dim) and (2 Dim). Der  T~sch  ist groJ3  seems to say nothing about its 
height. Ignoring these uncertainties for the moment, we observe some com- 
plementarity between groJ3 and dick. 
A further restr~ction  in the combination of  adjectives is connected with 
round or globular objects, such as Teller, Topf, Ball, Apfel, etc. With these 
nouns lang and breit cannot be combined, and for Ball, Apfel, etc., hoch is 
also ruled out. groj3 on the other hand refers to all three dimensions. This 
may be shown as follows: 
(25)  Noun  (1 Dim)  (2Dim)  (3Dim) 
Topf  1  hOch 
groB 
groR 
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As to Ball the entry dick is given in brackets, because it strikes me somewhat 
deviant, whereas it is quite normal in combination with, let's say, Apfel. 
3.2. It is obvious, that the facts adduced in (22) through (25) cannot be ex- 
plained without an examination of certain features of the semantic structure 
of the nouns involved. It goes without saying, that we cannot give here a full 
account of the class of nouns in question, not even of their spatial structure. 
We will sketch only some aspects, that may enable us to state the properties 
of spatial adjectives, on the basis of which much of their behavior can be 
predicted. 
We assume then, that each of the nouns in question is semantically organ- 
ized in part according to three -  or at least two, as Fenster, Straje, Platz, 
etc. - orthogonal dimensions.lS These dimensions are specified by further 
markers, so that the possible combinations with adjectives follow as exem- 
plified above. The dimensions, together with all their qualifications, are part 
of the spatial strncture of the nouns, these in turn being part of the further 
specification of the feature (Physical Object), which is, besides its spatiality, 
characterized for instance with respect to consistency as rigid, soft, etc. The 
marker (Space), that we  wlll introduce in order to account for this dimen- 
sionality, must be understood rather abstractly. (Space) represents the fact, 
that a large part of  our experience is organized according to spatiality, of 
which the real three dimensional space is only one instance. Other domains 
of our conceptual structure, such as evaluation, importance etc., and even 
of our perception, as, for instance, pitch, are modeled within the same frame- 
work. And a lot of linguistic facts suggest that even time is to be understood 
as a  one-dimensional space. Thus,  if  dominated  by  the marker  (Physical 
Object), then (Space) represents the physical dimensions of space; if not, as 
for instance in groje Angst, hoher Preis, hoher Ton, lange Zeit, then it indi- 
cates a more abstract space structure. From these considerations it is clear, 
that the number of dimensions is specific for each type of space. This can be 
represented formally by taking (Space) not as a binary feature with values 
"  + " and "  -", but as a marker with numerical value (n Space) with n  =  1 
for instance in Zeit, n=2 in Flache and n=3 in physical objects as  Wagen, 
Ball, etc. If necessary, then (-Space)  may indicate absence of  any dimen- 
Is There are, of course, other nouns, for which these assumptions do not hold. Jacke, 
Mantel. Tiife  -  to mention only three -  are not organized along the three orthoeonal di-  .  -  - 
mensionr. 14fu,8rrl, for instancc, nlay  bc  modified by   la,^! and ilick, but not  by hrcir, and 
if it is moditicd by  weir, then quite another property is est.tbl~shed.  dkk on thc other hand 
has a different meaning if combined with. let us say. Tiir and Mantel. It  is ambieuous in a  .  .  .  - 
certain way, if used with Tute, referring either to the material of which it consists or to 
the object as a whole. We must ignore all these facts here, hoping only, that our analysis 
will facilitate their further investigation. 
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~ionality.~o  With (n Space) we can abandon the markers (1 Dim), (2 Dlm), 
and (3 Dim) given in (19). 
As to the markers for further specification of the different dimensions, we 
have already introduced (Vert) and (Second). One more marker is needed 
to indicate  whether  one axis of an object is understood with respect to a 
presumed  observer, which is by  no means necessarily the speaker  or the 
hearer. By  (+Observ) we will mark an axis, by which an object is normally 
related to its observer or user, which is directed to the observer or -  which 
amounts to the same thing -  away from him. (+  Observ) is needed in vorn, 
hinten, vor, hinter, Riicken, etc. It can easily be seen, that this marker governs 
the behavior of tief, whereas verticality is only introduced contextually, be- 
cause we have Der Schrank ist  tief with horizontal, and Das Meer is! tief, 
with  vertical  (+Pol)-axis.  It seems evident,  that (Observ)  represents  an 
organizing feature of our understanding of the world. And it is equally evi- 
dent, that it does not represent a feature of  the objects as such. 
The markers (+Vert) and (+Observ) share a certain property, namely the 
orientation of an axis not with respect to the internal structure of an object, 
but to its environment: orientation with respect to the observer in the case 
of (+  Observ), and with respect to the surface of the earth in the normal case 
of (+Vert). This common property of (+Vert) and (+Observ) will be rep- 
resented by the marker (-Inherent),  indicating that the direction of an axis 
is not purely inherent to a given object, but depends on its normal placement 
with respect to its environment. The corresponding marker (+Inherent) will 
then represent the fact, that no relation of a given axis to the environment 
of the object is involved. The marker (-Inherent)  establishes at the same 
time a zero point, if the dimension in question is measured. For (+Vert) the 
zero point is the bottom of a given object or distance, for (+  Observ) it is the 
side facing the observer. This accounts for the fact that for hoch, tief, and 
weit a certain direction is involved for the plus pole of the scale, which is not 
the case for lung, breit, dick, and grofl. 
The conceptual interpretation of (Inherent) seems, thus, fairly clear. That 
its separate representation in the semantic structure turns out to be necessary, 
has among others the following reason. Only (-Inherent)-adjectives  may be 
combined with a prepositional phrase like iiber der Erde, vor der Stadt, etc., 
20  That (1  Space), (2 Space), and (3  Space) are necessary for purely linguistic reasons, 
will be seen later. That all three types of dimensionality are possible within the perceptual 
structure of human beings seems to be fairly clear. But it may very well be, that three 
dimensionality is the innate upper limit for the human apperception. This would mean 
then, Llmt  miur(n)=3  is a linguistic universal. All spaces with more than three dimensions, 
as constructed in modern geometry, are in that case parasitic, derivative structures, which 
are possible on the basis of the variability of n in (n Space). But we will not speculate on 
this point any further. MANFRED BIERWISCH 
thus forming an Adverbial. So  we  get (26), but only with totally different 
syntactic and semantic structure do we get (27): 
(26)  (a)  Das Haus liegt weit vor der Stadt. 
(b) Das Flugzeug fliegt hoch iiber den Wolken. 
(c)  Die Stadt lag tief unter ihm. 
(27)  (a) Der Tisch steht lang vor dem Fenster. 
(b) Die Wolken hingen breit uber der Stadt. 
(c)  Er stand groB in der Tur. 
In (27) the adjectives do not enter an Adverbial, but are reduced predicates 
of the subject of the sentence. 
Although we  have already introduced  the marker (Second) in order to 
distinguish among the non-vertical dimensions, this w~ll  not be sufficient to 
describe the behavior of lang vs. hoch and breit. From the examples in (23) 
it can be seen, that an object may -  but need not -  have a maximal axis. This 
axis is occupied by hoch if it is normally vertical, and by lang otherwise. But 
if an object is marked (fobserv) for one of its dimensions and this dimen- 
sion is not at the same time maximal, then lang is ruled out completely. In 
that case, if  the vertical axis is not simultaneously the maximal one, the 
(+Second)-marked  dimension may  be maximal. This, for instance, is the 
case with Schreibtisch. These facts can be described by a marker (+Max) 
for the maximal dimension of an object, in case there is one, and (-Max) 
for all other dimensions. The markers (FMax) then represent an aspect of 
the expected proportions of an object. Although it seems natural that ex- 
pected proportionality  determines our conception of objects rather deeply, 
it is not easy to decide whether it is one of the basic features that govern our 
interaction with the surrounding world or not. But even if it could be further 
reduced to more elementary features, it seems clear to me, that something 
like the (f  Max)-markers must  enter  the semantic description  of  spatial 
structure. 
A last pair of  markers will discriminate between main dimensions and 
subsidiary ones, where the latter constitute only the volume of  an object, 
presupposing one or two main dimensions. The marker (-Main)  determines 
the behavior of  dick, (+Main) indicates all dimensions involved in the use 
of gro/3. Although this distinction is not unplausible, it seems less cogent 
than the previous ones. I do not know of other semantic facts that motivate 
its introduction with sufficient clarity, and its psychological interpretation 
is far from clear. The above mentioned difficulties with dick (cf. fn. 19) may 
indicate, that something has not been correctly understood here.  Perhaps 
another interpretation of the features will suffice, but perhaps quite a different 
distinction will be necessary. Nevertheless, since the behavior of dickldiinn SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
and kleinlgroJ  will be predicted in terms of these markers with rather good 
approximation, we  will go on with (+Main), keeping in mind some reser- 
vation as to its definiteness. 
3.3.  Having established the necessary markers, we  may now  indicate how 
the different dimensions of  nouns are to be  organized, in order to explain 
their interaction with the spatial adjectives. Consider Schrank as an illustra- 
tive example, where [+Noun] stands for all its syntactic features: 
@XI  Schrank 
I 
With this kind of semantic structure we change radically the concept of sense 
characterization proposed by Fodor and Katz. For comments and motiva- 
tion of  this change see section 4. For the moment it may only be noted, that 
branching in (28) and all the following diagrams does not mean "alternatively 
present",  as in the famous bachelor-example from Fodor and Katz. All the 
markers of (28) -where  (M,) through (N,) indicate further necessary speci- 
fications -  are to be understood as coexistent. The tree structure indicates 
their relative subordination. What is formally meant by  "subordination" 
will become somewhat clearer m section 4. 
Omitting all the markers on which the behavior of spatial adjectives does 
not depend or which are automatically predictable, as (-Inherent)  for (+ 
Vert) and (+Observ),  we  can now give the structure of  certain diagnostic 
nouns as under (29). 
The numbers at  the end of the different branches are not part of the semantic 
structure of the given examples. They are used only by way of illustration in 
order to show how the dimensions are distributed on the different markers 
under (n  Space). It will be seen later, that this numbering is supefluous for 
linguisticpurposes. And as far as a distribution of then dimensions, indicated MANFRED BIERWISCH 
(a)  Wagen  (b)  Schrank 
( 3 Space  ( 3 Space ) 
I 
( +  Maln  I 
( +  Maln ) 
(-ve-ve;t  )  /'-... 
(+Max)  ( +  Second)  / 
i  i  3  I  i  1 
(c)  Tiir  (dl  Brett 
( 3 Space)  (3  Space) 
(+  Maea!r  1  (+Maea:n) 
( + Veaecond  )  \  (-Vert ) 
A  I 
(+Max)  /  (  Max )  ( +  Second )  / 
4  2  3  i  i  3 
(el  Zigarette  (f)  Stange 
( 3 Space)  (3  Space) 
(.  Ma-Maln  (+  ManMaln  > 
I  :.  I 
r., 
(-Vert)  ,'  ><<  (+Max)  ,  \  ,  \ 
I  ,'  1,  I  ,  , 
,  \ 
(*Max  )  ,'  \  (-Second)  ,,'  ', 
I 
(-Second)  /  i  i  3 
i  5  I 
(g)  Fenster  (h)  StraRe 
( 2 Space)  (2  Space) 
I 
( +  Maln )  I 
( + Ma~n) 
(*  venert)  I 
I 
( - Vert ) 
(+ Second )  (+~a-~~~d) 
i  i  2  i  2 
in (n  Space), is needed, this will  be  governed by  general rules, which say 
something like the following: 
(30)  Given a structure with the marker (n Space), then m dimensions belong 
to the m branches descending from the marker (+Main) with msn. 
The remaining n-m  dimensions belong to the branches not marked 
(+Main). 
In order to treat the behavior of spatial adjectives with respect to round and 
globular objects, it seems sufficient to use the markers (-Max)  and (-Sec- SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
ond) for the dimensions involved. Nevertheless,  since a feature (Round) 
appears to be necessary elsewhere -  for instance in Kurve, Bogen and in rund 
itself -  and since it may very well be a basic feature of perception, we will 
use it in the following examples: 
(31) 
(a)  Topf  (b)  Rad 
( 3 Space )  ( 3  Space) 
I 
(  +  Maln )  ( + Maealn  ) 
I  I. 
( + venert  )  (+Round 
1  (+Round  1  )  (-Max)  I 
I 
I  I  I  I 
I  (-Max)  ( - Second )  ,--..  I 
I  I 
,-  -. 
(-Second )  1  2  I 
3 
I  ,-._ 
,*  .. 
1  2  3 
(c)  Apfel  (d)  Krels 
( 3  Space )  ( 2  Space ) 
I 
( - Vert )  I 
( - Vert) 
I 
( + Round  I 
(  +  Round ) 
I 
(-Max)  I 
( - Max ) 
I 
( - Second)  I 
( - S_e&?Qd ) 
,.T.  _-  , --.  .  _*'  .., 
-23  1  1  2 
The marker (+Round) then represents globular shape, if  all three dimen- 
sions are involved, and circular shape, if only two are involved. And we may 
add to (30) the clause: 
(32)  At least  2  dimensions belong  to the brauch(es) dominated  by  (+ 
Round). 
3.4.  As mentioned above, the markers (&Inherent) may be inserted in these 
structures according to certain redundancy conventions. The same may hold 
for other markers as well. In general, it is clear, that to a certain extent struc- 
tures of the kind exemplified in (29) and (31) are governed by general rules 
pertaining to the innate predispositions of concept formation and language MANFRED BIERWISCH 
learning, which must not be  stated in individual  grammars. Those rules 
would then allow us  to eliminate from the lexical entries all the markers 
specified by its application. So the markers (-Max)  and (-Second)  could 
surely be predicted from (+Round) for all dimensions subordinated to this 
marker and thus eliminated from (31)(a) through (d).  Similarly (-Second) 
may be predicted from (+Max), hut only within the same dimension, be- 
cause another dimension may very well be marked (+  Second). Perhaps rules 
of this kind may also guarantee, that only one dimension is marked (+Sec- 
ond), i.e., that (+Second) is dominated only once by (n Space), and so on. 
It seems clear to me, that the general principles of such a "marker  syntax" 
as weU  as a certain set of specified rules with concrete marker content belong 
to the general theory that characterizes our basic semantic capacity. On the 
formal structure of those rules we  will touch shortly in section 4.2. 
On the basis of such structures as (29) and (31) it will become clear, how 
the scales, for which (Pol) indicates a certain value, are to be characterized. 
Such a scale is specified by certain markers which guarantee, that (+Poi) 
and (-Pol)  are connected with all and only the appropriate dimensions. 
lung, for instance, wiU  contain the markers (+Max) (which implies (-Sec- 
ond), as noted in the previous paragraph) and (-Vat).  Thus it may be com- 
bined  with  Wagen, Brett, Stange,  and Zigarette,  but not with  Fenster  or 
Turm (which is (+Vat) in its only (+Main)dimension).  hoch, on the other 
hand, is not marked for (*Max),  but it is (+Vert),  thus combining with 
Wagen, Stange  (which is not (-Vert)!),  Fenster  and Turm, but not with 
Brett or Zigarette. And it can also be seen, that lung and hoch must be related 
to different branches of the marker tree with respect to  Wagen, but to the 
same branch with respect to Stange. Thus we can account for all facts of the 
kind exemplified above in (22). 
But before we can state explicitly the semantic structure of the adjectives 
considered, some remarks on the presupposed formalism are necessary. 
4.  SOME REMARKS ON THE FORMAL ASPECTS 
OF A  SEMANTIC THEORY 
4.1.  The following remarks on the formal structure of the theory presupposed 
in our analysis must, of course, be rather sketchy. The main purpose of the 
present article is to clarify the nature of  semantic markers, exemplified by a 
set of German adjectives, and we will not go into the details of the assumed 
theory. Its more complete description and motivation  must be given else- 
where. Let me note, however, that I will assume the basic principles of the 
theory developed by Katz, Fodor, and Postal as far as possible and that I 
will change it -  somewhat radically -  only in two points: the structure of the SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
lexical entries and the form of the semantic rules.21 Let us turn then first to 
the lexical entries. 
From our examples in (28),  (29),  and (31) it is clear, that we  use marker 
trees instead of  the marker strings (really: sets of  markers) of  Fodor and 
Katz. We will mention only one of  the several reasons that motivate this 
assumption. It is impossible to predict the behavior of  lung  and grofl, if 
certain objects were not to be marked simultaneously by both elements of a 
binary marker, say (+Inherent) and (-Inherent)  or (+Vert) and (-Vert). 
But this, of course, would lead to an inherent contradiction, if simply sets 
of  markers  are presupposed.22  Thus the contradictory  (or  antonymous) 
markers must be arranged in such a way, that they cannot conflict with each  . 
other. This is guaranteed by  their arrangement on different branches of a 
tree, where, in our case, each branch represents the properties of  different 
 dimension^.^^ From this assumption it follows, that ordering of the markers 
is not arbitrary, as it would be in simple marker sets, but must conform to 
principles of subordination governing tree structure. 
The next point to be noted is that the marker trees are not formally analo- 
gous to constituent structure trees, but rather to dependency trees. That 
means, two markers (M) and (N),  branching from a Marker (P),  are not 
dominated by  (P), this being the category  to  which the string (M)(N) is 
assigned, but they are dependent on (P) in a sense similar to that formalized 
in the theory of dependency grammars. In technical terms, all markers of a 
marker tree are terminal elements.24 This suggests that our proposed lexical 
entries may be based on the formal principles of dependency systems.25 This 
allows us  to represent the marker trees as strings of markers, bracketed 
21 It  may be noted by the way, that Katz himself has abandoned the original principles of 
the structure of lexical entries and of the amalgamation rules, although without stating 
this change explicitly. Cf. notes 26 and 28 below. 
. 
22 It might be objected, that one could avoid this dilemma by introducing different mark- 
ers, say  (Vert) and (Horizontal) instead of (+  Vert) and (-  Vert). But this sim~lv  begs  .. . 
the quetiun. (Hori~ontal)  in  this cdse \vould have n.>t only the i:me  intcrprctarion as 
(  - Vert], but it wauld also scr\.e all 11  form31 funclions. (Verlj 2nd  (H~,rirantali)  would be 
an antonymous pair  of markers (in terms of  Katz), and these cannot enter one set of 
inarkers without leading to a contradiction. 
23 This is the principle already used in syntactic trees. Two contradictory syntactic mark- 
ers, say [+  Human] and I-  Human] are allowed to occur in one Phrasemarker at the 
same time, but not within one complex symbol, without leadingto a violation. For details 
see Chomsky, Aspects of  the Theory of  Syntax. 
24  Obviously, the same holds in a certain sense for the syntactic features within complex 
symbols as introduced by  Chomsky, in so far as subordination between features is involved. 
Compare for instance the "feature trees" within the phrase-marker on p.  108 of Aspects 
of  the Theory of  Syntax. 
2s We  will use in the following the notational conventions of  Gaifman, 'Dependency 
Systems and Phrase-Structure Systems', Information and  Control 8 (1965) 304-37.  There 
a dependency rule is formulated as follows: X(Y1, Yz ... YI*YI+I  ... Yn), which specifies 
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according  to the principles developed in dependency theory.  It must  be 
stressed,  however,  that  the  provisional  usage  of  some  terminology  and 
fomalism of  dependency theory made on the following pages is only for 
convenience and  brevity,  because  we  cannot  develop  a  more  adequate 
formalism in sufficient  detail witbm the present paper. In general, dependen- 
cy theory  must not be taken as the formalization of the principles under- 
lying the  semantic structure of natural languages for several reasons, the 
most obvious of which is the fact that tree structure is not preserved as soon 
as  relational  markers  are introduced  in the theory.  We  cannot  go into 
details here  and would  only note that the possibility of using dependency 
concepts in general  and tree  representation  in  particular  is  strongly de- 
pendent on the limitations of our present interests. 
Before we illustrate  this  representation, it must be noted that within the 
(3  Space ) 
I 
(bl (3  Space ) 
\ 
(c) [(3  Space )[(+  Ma~n)[(-Vert  )[[(+Max )I[( +Second  )I1  [( +Vert  )I111 
semantic structure the linear order of the elements is completely irrelevant 
(which does not hold for the syntactic interpretation of dependency systems). 
The only  relation  that must be uniquely represented, is their relative de- 
a dependency (sub) tree of the form 
Y,  Y2  . . .  YI  Y,.,  . . .  Y" 
This in turn may be transferred to aparenthetical expression of the form ((Yr)(Ya)  .. .  (YI)  X 
(Yltl) .  .. (Y3)  That means, a dependency rule specifies  for a given element X a sequence 
of  elements YI, ...,  Yn, that depend on  Xin that order, with X between Yl and Y,+I. SOME  SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
pendence. This allows us  to rearrange the marker trees topologically so, 
that the governing marker is always to the left of  all its dependents. This 
form of the tree can be taken as the basis for a normalized bracketing of 
markers. Thus in the example  Wagen (29)(a), we  rearrange (33)(a) as (b), 
this then being the basis for the parenthetical expression (c). (Henceforth we 
use square brackets to indicate dependency.) 
The semantic structure of a lexical entry can now be given as a string of 
markers, but with a superimposed dependency, represented as bracketing in 
the manner of (33)(c). This additional qualification is the critical difference 
between our concept and that of sense characterization proposed by Fodor 
and Katz.28 
4.2.  Although the semantic structure of lexical entries may be represented 
by  dependency trees,  which  in turn  can  be  specified  by  a  dependency 
grammar,  it would  be  pointless  to construct a  grammar  that  generates 
all and only the marker trees of a given lexicon. Rather the lexical entries 
must be given (and learned) item by item, but according to the general prin- 
ciples of the semantic structure. Nevertheless, there will be generative rules 
within the lexicon. As we  have already noted, the combination of markers 
within the lexical entries is predictable to a certain extent, in part by universal 
redundancy conventions, in part perhaps, by language specific rules. 
In order to sketch the form of these rules, we must generalize somewhat 
the notion of dependency rule. As defined by Gaifman, a dependency rule 
specifies a sequence of elements Y,, ..., Y,,, that directly depend on a given 
element X. We will extend this definition in such a way, that a dependency 
26  Recently Katz has also used additional bracketing in cases where mere concatenation  . 
of markers is too obviously inadequate. In  The Philosophy of  Language, p. 167, the follow- 
ing entry for  chase is given (I have adjusted some brackets according to the comments 
on pp. 168-9,  since the entry on p.  167 contains some misprints: 17 left parenthesesare 
paired with 15 right ones): 
chase i- Verb, Verb Transitive, ... ;  ((Activity)(Nature: (Physical)) of X), ((Movement) 
(Rate: (FastNCharacter: (Followinx>~~.  (Intention of X: (Trying to catch ((Y)  .  .. . 
i(~ovekntjikate:  (~astlj))));  <sR>. 
The marker (Fast) is said to qualify the marker (Movement) as to nature, (Following) 
qualifies it as to character. X is a dummv svmbol to be reolaced bv  the markers of the  . . 
\uhjs[, Y is ro be rcplaccd by  rhc markers of the ohje.-1. The ftlrmal <rates of rlie ditlcrem 
brackets, of ":" 2nd of"uf" is nor diwusicd. \Vhcrher 3 f.>rntaliration in rcrnls of dcpcnrl- 
ency relations, which would be possible, is in accordance with the intentions of Katz, is 
not clear to me. However, some formalization would be necessary, and it will clearly 
involve much more structure than pure marker concatenation. Note, by  the way, that the 
use of the dummies X and Y results in a type of projection rule, which clearly exceeds the 
formation of set unions underlying the originally proposed amalgamation rules. In fact 
it amounts to something like the operation proposed below as "generalized dependency 
rule".  Cf. also note 24. MANFRED BlERWISCH 
rule places a given element X at a specified place in a given dependency tree. 
This may be done in the following manner: 
(34)  If  Y is an element of a given dependency tree, then by the rule 
(a)  X[Y[*]]  the element X is introduced in the tree as a direct (right) 
dependent of Y; 
(b) X[*[Y]] the element X is introduced in the tree as the direct (left) 
governer of Y and X depends on that element, on which Y was 
dependent before the rule application. 
Instead of the single elements X and Y in the rules we  may specify entire 
branches and subtrees of  the trees that are to be operated on or inserted.27 
Of course, all these notions must be formalized more carefulfy. But here we 
cannot go into this any further. We only give some examples of the above 
mentioned redundancies within the semantic structure of space: 
(35)  (a) (-Inherent)  [*(+Vert)] 
(b) (-Inherent)  [*(+  Observ)] 
(c)  (-Second)  [(+Max)  [*]I 
(d)  [(-Max)  [(-Second)]]  [( f  Round) [*I] 
The rules (35)(a) and (b) insert (-Inherent)  between (+Vert) and (+  Observ) 
respectively and their governing markers.  (35)(c) subordinates  (-Second) 
to any occurrence of (+Max) in the lexicon. And (35)(d) makes the whole 
(36)  (a)  ~opf  (b)   opt 
( 3 Space  ( 3 Space  ) 
I  I 
subtree [(-Max)  [(-Second)]]  dependent on (+Round). If we  supply the 
lexicon with the rules (35), then for instance Topf  may be  represented as 
(36)(a) instead of the former representation (31)(a). And (36)(a) will be turned 
into (36)(b) by application of (35)(a) and (d). 
27  Ob~iously  the original dependency rule as given in note 21 may be treated as a special 
case of  (34)(b), where all the YI ... Y,  are governing elements of unconnected subtrees, 
dependent on no other element before the rule application and therefore dependent on X 
when the rule has been applied. SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
The same treatment of redundancies could be exemplified with the other 
entries in (29) and (31). As far as the rules (35) are universal -  and I would 
guess they are not idiosyncratic for German -  they represent to a certain 
extent the organization of space structures by human beings. 
4.3.  Now it is most important to note, that the redundancy rules are by no 
means the only rules of  the lexicon. Rather the semantic structure of  all 
lexical entries must be constructed in the form of rules combining structured 
marker  sets. Although this principle concerns lexical items in general -  in- 
cluding nouns, verbs and prepositions -  we  will restrict our attention here 
to the adjectives so far considered. 
From the discussion in sections 2 and 3 it will be clear, that the meaning 
of the adjectives in question is to be understood as an instruction to place 
the (Pol)-marker into the marker tree of the modified noun in such a way, 
that all and only the appropriate dimensions are additionally marked  by 
(+Pol) or (-Pol).  This leads to the following conception: The remainder 
R of section 2, that marks the scale to be modified by (Pol), is to be construct- 
ed formally as a dependency subtree with a marked place for the insertion of 
(Pol). This subtree together with the (Pol)-marker then forms a dependency 
rule of the kind roughly characterized by (34). But here a further clarification 
is in point. We may call the left hand side of a generalized dependency rule, 
the part to be inserted somewhere, its modification, and the right hand side 
of the rule its domain. That is, the (Pol)-marker constitutes the modification 
of  the adjectives under  consideration,  the remainder  R  constitutes  their 
domain. Now we define the notion of "matching domain"  as follows: 
(37)  Let D he the domain of a generalized dependency rule with X as one 
of its elements, and T a dependency (sub)tree containing X, then D 
and T match if and only if for each two elements Z, and Z, of D the 
following holds: if Z, depends (directly or indirectly) on Z, in D, then 
Z, depends (directly or indirectly) on Z, in T, in case Z, and 2, are in T. 
The last clause in (37) guarantees, that D and T match also if  not all the 
elements of D are in T. That at least one element is common in D and T 
follows from the condition, that the topmost element of D is also in T. And 
as far as the elements of D are in T, the same dependency hierarchy holds in 
D and T, if the domain and the tree match. The only element that is always 
in D, but usually not in T, is the place keeper *. We may now define the 
application of a generalized dependency rule as a two step operation in the 
following way: 
(38)  A generalized dependency rule P with a domain D that matches a 
dependency tree T, is applied to T in the following two steps: MANFRED BIERWISCH 
(a)  first each element Zi dependent on Zj in D, which is not in T, is 
inserted in T in such a way that Zi depends on Zj also in T; 
(b) secondly the governing element X of the modification M of P is 
substituted in T for the * introduced by step (a). AU elements de- 
pendent on X in M are also dependent on X in T. 
It can easily be seen that the place of * in the dependency tree T is uniquely 
determined by operation (38)(a). In fact, the insertion of * may often be the 
only effect of step (a). This, for example, holds trivially for the application 
of the redundancy rules (35). All these notions must be made more precise. 
But again we can only illustrate them here by an example. Let (39)  be the 
entry for hoch and (40) one branch of the entry for Stange bith all redundan- 
cies filled in. 
(39)  hoch: (+Pol) [(+  Main)[*[(-Inherent)[(+Vert)]]]] 
(40)  Stange: [(Phys Obj)[(3 Space)[(+ Main)[(+Max)[(-  Second)]]]]] 
Obviously, the domain D of (39) and the tree T, of which (40) is a branch, 
match, because they have the element (+Main) in common and there are 
no elements in D with nonmatching dependencies in T. In fact, (40) is the 
only branch in the entry of Stange that has an element in common with (39). 
It follows, therefore, that the rule (39) can be applied to (40), in case hoch 
and Stange appear in a sentence like Die Stange ist hoch. This will be done 
in the two steps (41)(a) and (b): 
(41)  (a)  [(Phys  Obj)[(3 Space)[(+ Main)[*[(-  Inherent)[(+ Vert)[(+ Max) 
[(- Second)llllllll 
(b)  [(Phys Obj)[(3 Space)[(+Main)[(+Pol)[(-Inherent)[(+Vert) 
[(+  Max)[(-Second)llllllll 
After this rule application the markers of  hoch are completely absorbed by 
the marker tree ofthe modified noun and Stange is now marked as (+Pol) 
and (+Vert),  which implies (-Inherent),  for its maximal dimension. That 
is exactly the desired result: The marker (+Vert) represents the fact, that 
Stange is understood as referring to a vertical object. For comparison con- 
sider the following tentative entry for lang: 
(42)  lang: (+Pol)[(+ Main)[*[(+ Inherent)[(+ Max)[(-Second)]]]]] 
The domain of (42) also matches with (40) as the only branch in the entry for 
Stange. But the application of (42) to (40) inserts only * and (+Inherent) in 
the first step and the result of applying (42) in a sentence like Die Stange ist 
lang  results in (+Pol) marking for the now inherent maximal dimension: 
(43)  [(Phys  Obj)[(3  Space)[(+ Main)[(+ Pol)[(+ lnherent)[(+Max)[(- 
Second)lllllll SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
This reflects the fact, that in Die Stange ist lang nothing is said about verti- 
cality and that  Stange  designates an object which is understood as having 
an inherent maximal dimension. 
From these examples it can be seen, that the domain D of a lexical entry 
such as (39) or (42) functions somewhat like the selection restriction of the 
Fodor-Katz-theory. The amalgamation of the noun and its modifier -  that 
means now: the application of the generalized dependency rule, given as the 
sense characterization of the adjective -  is possible only if the noun fulfils 
the conditions stated in D.28 This function of D as selection restriction is 
given by the definition (37) for matching. But the domain D serves one fur- 
ther purpose. By the convention (38)(a)  for rule application the domain D  , 
also introduces new markers in a given tree. This corresponds in a certain 
way to the transfer features recently proposed by Weinrei~h.~~ 
5.  LEXICAL ENTRIES FOR SPATIAL ADJECTIVES OF GERMAN 
5.1.  After these rather sketchy remarks on the general background we can 
return to particular problems of the semantic structure of the adjectives in 
question. 
First of all, the values of the (Space)-markers require further clarification. 
Consider the following examples: 
(44)  (a)  Das Brett ist lang. 
(b)  Das Brett ist breit. 
(c)  Das Brett ist dick. 
(d) Das Brett ist grol3. 
Compare in this connection the analysis of good given by  Katz in The Philosophy of 
Language,  p.  296: 
good +  Adjective, ... :  (+)  <(Evah: 0))  .  .  ... 
The cclwiion re,triction  (tv.tl,:  ( )) starcs, rhdr  the noun ro  be  inodificd by  pod  mu,[ 
ha\c the mrker(s) spk.~i>ing  eval~rion  uith r~~spccr  IU 3 dertain aspcir X, sty  iunitlon, 
purpose, duty etc. The empty brackets indicate the place, where the marker (+)  has to be 
inserted &ally.  It can easily be seen, that the semantic part of that entry can be given as a 
generalized dependency rule as follows: 
good: (+  Pol)[@val)[*ll 
Z9 Weinreich, 'Explorations in Semantic Theory', in Current Trends in Linguistics 3, The 
Hague 1966. There instead of the selection restrictions of Fodor and Katz a special kind 
of markers is proposed, which are, according to a general rule,  iransfrred hum a given 
word to the modi6ed constituent, where they then act as normal semantic elements. If the 
insertion of  transfer features conflicts with the ones  already present, then a violation 
results. But that is just the case when -  in terms of our conception-D  and T do not match. 
And we may therefore define the notion "violation with respect to marker X"  as the result 
of an application of a rule P to a tree T, although T does not fnEl the matching condition 
with respect to marker X. Thus, for instance, the sentence Die Zigarette  isf hoch would 
contain a violation with respect to (Vert). MANFRED BIERWISCH 
(e)  Die Stange ist lang. 
(f)  Die Stange ist hoch. 
(g)  Die Stange ist dick. 
(h)  Die Stange ist groB. 
(i)  Der Wagen ist groB. 
In (a), (b), (c), (e), and (f) clearly one dimension is involved. (The difference 
between (e) and (f) was discussed above.) But groJ  concerns two dimensions 
in (d), only one in (h), and three in (i). dick specifies only one dimension in 
(c), but two dimensions in (g). That is, the dimensionality of groj and dick 
is variable, that of lang, breit, and hoch is always exactly on& We may rep- 
resent this observation by using (1 Space) for the latter words and (n Space) 
for dick and groj with n as the number of all (+Main) marked dimensions 
of the modified noun in case of groj and all the (-Main)-dimensions  in case 
of dick. It must be noted, that an important feature of the interpretation of 
the (Space)- and (Pol)-markers corresponds to this n-dimensionality: The 
(+Pol) or (-Pol)-marker,  determined by (n Space), must not be understood 
as marking each of the n dimensions separately, but as a specification of the 
product of  the n major or minor dimensions involved. In a sentence like 
Peters  Wagen ist groJer als Gustavs Wagen it is not asserted that Peters car 
is longer, broader, and higher, but only that it is bigger with respect to the 
general impression, and that is, with respect to the product of all three di- 
mensions. Other examples would  show the same for two dimensions. For 
n= 1 this observation holds trivially: The product of one dimension is that 
dimension itself. So the sentences Die Nadel ist zu groJ  and Die Nadel ist zu 
lung express the same assertion. 
With this interpretation of  the values for (Space) in mind, we  need an 
additional  convention  about  the  compatibility  or  matching  of  (Space)- 
markers with different values. We  may  postulate that a marker (i Space) 
satisfies the conditions for matching with respect to a marker (j Space), in 
case i Ij,  or more formally: 
(45)  Let (i Space) and (j Space) be two markers with i <j. Then (i Space) is 
said to be an instance of (j Space). 
With this definition (n  Space) is an  instance of (1 Space), (2 Space), and (3 
Space), since the variable value of n may be always taken to be equal to or 
less than 1, 2,  or 3. The convention (45)  looks somewhat ad hoc, and this 
may indicate that something is not correctly understood with respect to the 
representation  of  space and dimensionality. But it may very well  be that 
something like (45)  holds for other markers as well, so that this conven- 
tion can be formulated  more generally. Nevertheless,  for the moment we SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTlVALS 
must be content with the rather narrow formulation (45).  Technically, (45) 
guarantees that a domain containing (n Space) or (1 Space) can match with 
each tree containing (2 Space) or (3 Space). 
5.2.  The second problem to be discussed is the fact, that not all the (+Pol) 
space adjectives have simple and unique antonymous counterparts. In (7) we 
have already listed nah and eng as different antonyms to weif and diinn and 
schlank as antonyms to dick. This implies that weit and dick must be charac- 
terized by at least two different meanings, one for each of its counterparts. 
Of course, further meanings must be accounted for, which will not concern 
us here, for instance the meaning of weit in ein weiterer Komplex, in the sense  , 
"a  further complex" as opposed to the sense "a  less narrow complex". But 
even if  we restrict our attention to the antonyms of nah and eng, the facts 
are still more complicated. Consider the following sentences: 
(46)  (a)  Das Ziel ist weit.  Das Ziel ist nah. 
(b)  Der Weg ist weit.  Der Weg ist nah. 
(c)  Der Weg ist weit.  Der Weg ist kurz. 
(d) Der Weg ist lang.  Der Weg ist kurz. 
The examples (46)(a) and (b) show, that Der  Weg ist  weit is ambiguous, 
meaning either the road as a whole is far from here -  with weit antonymous 
to nah -  or the road is long, and then nah cannot serve as counterpart. In 
(46)(c) weit is understood as parallel to lang. In all these cases weit, and of 
course nah, specify only one dimension, whereas weit with the antonym eng 
involves at least two dimensions and must be marked (n Space). Only the 
pair weitlnah can enter into Adverbials of the form weit vor der Stadt, nah 
am Abgrund,  as exemplified in  (26). And  only in that sense weit must be 
marked (-Inherent).  The antonymous pair weitleng on the other hand, if 
these are strictly antonymous at all, seems to require a further marker rep- 
resenting the fact, that a distance between certain objects or parts of an ob- 
ject is intended. This apparently follows from such cases as eine enge Strape, 
der weite Platz, eine  weite Offnung etc. From groplklein  here weitleng are 
distinguished by the clear indication of the distance between certain border- 
lines and the foregrounding of the space between them. We will represent 
this by a tentative marker (+Distance), that must be taken as a mere label 
for a gap to be filled in by further investigations. 
Similar complications  arise with respect to tieflfach. The following ex- 
amples show thatfach  is not simply the antonym to tie$ 
(47)  (a)  Der FluB ist tief.  Der FluR ist flach. 
(b) Das Hans ist tief.  Das Haus ist flach. 
(c)  Er war tief im Wald.  *Er war flach im Wald. MANFRED BIERWISCH 
Only in (47)(a) flach functions as antonym to fief. (47)(b) demonstrates that 
flach qualifies an object in a certain sense as plain with respect to the horizon 
of a given observer. tief  on the other hand is not sufficiently  characterized 
as the (+Pol)-element for the observer oriented dimension. It simultaneously 
indicates that this dimension constitutes something like an interior, if refer- 
ring to an object with more than one dimension. We represent these facts by 
the markers (+Plain) forflach and (-Plain)  for tie5 that are as provisional 
as (+Distance). And although it seems plausible that tief  and Path behave 
in a certain sense as antonyms not because of the (Pol)-marker, but because 
of  this (Plain)-marker, it may very well turn out that quite another analysis 
is necessary, where (+Plain) and (-Plain)  are not primitive elements. (We 
completely ignore the meaning of  tief  as the antonym to hoch  with respect 
to pitch.) 
The difficulties are somewhat different with dick/diinn. It seems to me, that 
these are true antonyms, but they too require additional marking. The prop- 
erty relevant for this pair concerns density and may be paraphrased as "re- 
sistence to penetration".  It must be  left open, whether this property con- 
stitutes a true primitive element of  the universal marker alphabet. We rep- 
resent it tentatively by (+Density). 
5.3.  We  are now ready to state the sense characterization of the adjectives 
explicitly. We presuppose, that at least the redundancy rules (35) are included 
in the lexicon. Therefore the sense characterizations will be given redundancy 
,-  free. We  omit also the necessary syntactic features $are  top~;  qualify the 
elements as adjectives, and determine whether they&iy  functlon as adverbs 
or not. 
(48)  (a) lang :  (+Pol) [(l Space)[*[(+ Inherent)[(+ Max)]]]] 
(h)  kurz:  (-Pol)  [(I Space)[*[(+Inherent)[(+Max)]]]] 
(49)  (a)  breit :  (+Pol) [(l Space)[*[(+ Second)]]] 
(b) schmal: (-Pol)  [(l Space)[*[(+Second)]]] 
(50)  (a)  hoch:  (+Pol) [(1 Space)[*[(+Vert)]]] 
(b) niedrig: (-Pol)  [(I Space)[*[(+ Vert)]]] 
(51)  (a)  weit:  (+Pol)  [(I  Space)[*[(-Inherent)]]] 
(b)  nahe:  (-Pol)  [(I Space)[*[(-Inherent)]]] 
(52)  (a)  gro0:  (+Pol) [(n Space)[(+ Main)[*]]] 
(b) klein:  (-Pol)  [(n Space)[(+ Main)[*]]] 
These are the primary spatial meanings, that can be accounted for in terms 
of the markers established in sections 2 and 3. Since (Space) is intended to 
be  a very abstract feature, (48) through (52) represent to a certain extent 
also the meaning of  the adjectives as modifiers of abstract nouns. (48) for SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
instance accounts for lange Zeit, ein kurzer Tug, (52) may account for cases 
such as grope Bedeutung, grope Angst and even grope Lunge, grofle Hohe, 
et~.~~  Some minor adjustments may be necessary; in particular it must be 
explained that the normal antonymous adjective for the abstract use of groJ 
is not klein,  but gering: the correct  combination is geringe Hohe, geringe 
Hoffnung, etc., instead of *kleine Hohe, *kleine Hoffnung. 
With some reservation we  will now formalize the meaning of weit vs. eng, 
dickldiinn and tief/Juch. 
(53)  (a)  weit: [(f Pol)[(+Distance)]]  [(n Space)[(+Main)[*]]] 
(b) eng : [(-Pol)[(+  Distance)]] [(n Space)[(+ Main)[*]]] 
Here the modification of the generalized dependency rule consists not of a 
single marker,  but  of the branch  [(+Pol)[(+Distance)]]  and  [(-Pol)[(+ 
Distance)]]  respectively.  This means that we  assume (+Distance) not as a 
marker  of  the domain  that may  or may not already  be  a feature of  the 
modified noun, but as an element always inserted by the adjective and not 
present before. If  this turns out to be incorrect, then (53) must be changed. 
As already shown, tief  andflach are not strictly parallel, and for the mo- 
ment the following characterization may best account for the facts: 
(54)  (a) tief:  [(+Pol)[(-  Plain)]] [(I Space)[*  [(f  Observ)]]] 
(b) flach:  (+Plain)  [(I Space)[*  [(+  Inherent)]]] 
tief  and Juch  are then antonyms with respect to (Plain), not to (Pol), and 
flach cannot be used in Adverbials such as *Jack  im  Wufd,  because of the 
marker (+Inherent) in its domain. (+Inherent) in turn excludes (f Observ). 
An adequate characterization of dick and diinn is most difficult. Although 
dick seems to have two completely different meanings in the two sentences 
Die Tiir ist dick and Die Suppe ist dick, these meanings are obviously related 
somehow. But for the time being I know of no plausible way to represent 
this relationship. We will,  therefore, state the purely dimensional meaning 
of  dickldiinn under (55) and rather provisionally a separate meaning with 
respect to consistency under (56): 
(55)  (a)  dick:  (+Pol) [(n Space)[(-Main)[*]]] 
(b) diinn: (-Pol)  [(n Space)[(-Main)[*]]] 
(56)  (a)  dick:  (+Pol) [(+Consistence)[(+Density)[*]]] 
(b) diinn: (-Pol)  [(+Consistence)[(+Density)[*]]] 
30  We cannot eo here into the details of the nominalization of the adiectives. But it can  - 
readily bc seen, thxl the). trill form abstract nouns nith lne nvarker (Sped a.;  the govcrnlng 
elcmcnt 01'  ib rcnrt. chnr:1cteri7:11ion.  This then will guardntec the matching of rhcse trees 
with the domain of gro.!3. 
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A more detailed investigation of the not purely spatial properties of semantic 
structure must clarify the relationship between primary spatial meanings of 
the adjectives considered so far, and their other, somehow "derived" mean- 
ings. Such a study may reveal deeper insight even in the spatial structure 
itself. But that goes beyond the scope of the present paper. 
6.1.  It goes without saying, that the description of a set of German adjectives 
we have sketched is rather incomplete and much in need of revision. Further 
investigation  may  change the details in several respects. But I hope that 
certain principles have become clear. Although I do not believe that all the 
markers introduced more or less tentatively may enter the universal set of 
semantic  markers, I would  like to claim that there are serious candidates 
for the universal set among them. And certain conclusions as to their nature 
and their combination can be drawn. 
First of all, the primitive elements that enter semantic descriptions have 
not necessarily a simple interpretation in terms of physics, geometry, biology 
and so on. It may presumably be the normal case, that a linguistically simple 
and elementary feature is rather complex with  respect to its physical  or 
physiological interpretation. This may become clearer by a comparison with 
phonological features. Accent for instance is with all its degrees a linguistic- 
ally homogeneous structure, whose interpretation in articulatory and acous- 
tic properties is rather complex: certain distinctions quite clearly made within 
the phonological structure are not present in the signal at all. Others are 
realized by duration, pitch and intensity sim~ltaneously.~~  Similar compli- 
cations may hold with respect to the interpretation of the semantic features. 
Second, the  primitive  semantic elements are not isolated features that 
must be learned item by item in the process of language acquisition and inter- 
preted in the linguistic theory strictly separated from each other. They are 
rather features of whole structures, such as normativity, spatiality, verticality, 
etc. There may he further dependencies between those structures. For in- 
stance, the specification of a maximal and a secondary axis may be possible 
only with respect to main dimensions. Those relations may in fact depend 
on the apperceptive structure, that is represented in the semantic markers. 
Linguistically they are expressed in part by  semantic redundancy rules. This 
may result in a partial ordering of the universal elements, the markers thus 
being a structured, instead of an unordered set. 
51 For a more detailed treatment of the interdependency  between accent, intonation, pitch, 
and loudness see for  instance Bierwisch, 'Regeln  fiir die Intonation deutscher Satze', 
Strrdia Grammafica 7, Berlin 1966. SOME SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS OF GERMAN ADJECTIVALS 
Third, all these markers (and the complex structures that they represent) 
must be thought of as part of the innate capacity for language learning. 
Therefore, what a child must he taught is not what a norm is, how space is 
structured, etc., all this being innate and developing spontaneously, hut only 
how and in which combination these structures are expressed. This seems to 
me the only possible basis  on which one can explain that a child may have 
grasped the whole complex semantic structure of his language before learning 
even the smallest bit of physics, geometry, and so on. 
And fourth, the formation of the primitive elements to the meanings of 
particular languages is governed by general principles of combination. These 
principles are by no means trivial,  as our analysis has clearly shown. They 
too must be an innate part of the capacity of language learning, emerging, 
but not learned in the course of language acquisition.  It must he  left open 
what  the correct formalization of these principles finally turns out to he. 
But we  have  shown that unstructured sets of markers cannot represent the 
complexity  of the meanings of natural languages. 
6.2. After this discussion of the theoretical status of the semantic markers 
and the principles of their combination we may turn back to the question 
(2) raised at the outset: Just what are the universal elements and how can 
they he established? It  is clear that the relation of language and thought, the 
necessary set of semantic primitives and its interpretation from our point of 
view is not a matter of a priori speculation. It may he approached only by 
tentative analysis of different languages, by checking the results against each 
other and against psychological, physiological and biological insights. In this 
way linguists may raise interesting questions to be answered by psychologists, 
and psychologists  may  check  their  results  by  comparison with linguistic 
requirements. 
This may be phrased  as an heuristic principle in the following way:  A 
semantic analysis of a lexical item is finished only if it leads to a combination 
of basic elements, that are true candidates for the universal set of semantic 
markers, i.e., that may he interpreted in terms of basic dimensions of the 
human apperceptive apparatus. Such a principle would impose on semantic 
analysis the requirement of revealing interpretability in addition to that of 
preciseness and internal consistency. It would prevent any vague speculation 
rather strictly. 
These considerations may also shed some light on such complicated and 
central problems as figurative meaning, metaphor, synaesthesia, etc. We have 
already mentioned the transference of spatial designations to temporal and 
other abstract relations. The question immediately carries over to all other 
kinds of  "derived  meaning".  What is the basis for such sentences as Der MANFRED BIERWISCH 
Preis ist hoch or Er  steckt tief in Schulden? I  am sure that we may come to a 
far better understanding of these mechanisms, if we look at them against the 
background of the apperceptive structures of the organism and its manifes- 
tation in the basic elements of the semantic structure and their principles of 
combination. 
Ultimately all these remarks and suggestions serve the purpose to become 
better acquainted with "the notion, that man may be equipped with highly 
specialized, biological propensities  that favor  and, indeed,  shape the  de- 
velopment of speech in the child and that roots of language may be as deeply 
grounded in our natural constitution as, for instance, our predisposition to 
use our hands3'.32 
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